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THE EFFECT OF THE ANNULMENT DECISIONS IN
AMCO v. INDONESIA AND KLOCKIVER v. CAMEROON
ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
Sylvia Schatz*
INTRODUCTION
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID)" provides a forum for arbitrating investment disputes between
foreign investors and contracting states.' Theoretically, ICSID interna-
* J.D., 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]. The United States signed the Convention on August 27, 1965. Note,
Some Legal Questions Concerning the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 679, 679
n.1 (1968). The Senate approved the Convention on May 16, 1966, and President
Johnson ratified it on June 1, 1966. Id. Congress later enacted enabling legislation. 22
U.S.C. §§ 1650, 1650a (1966).
2. Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some Ob-
servations on Jurisdiction, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAV'L L. 263, 264 (1966) [hereinafter
Broches, Observations on Jurisdiction]. To initiate ICSID proceedings, an applicant
must establish a prima facie case that ICSID has jurisdiction over the dispute.
Broches, Settlement of Disputes Arising out of Investment in Developing Countries, 11
INT'L Bus. LAW. 206, 208 (1983) [hereinafter Broches, Settlement of Disputes]. The
ICSID Secretary-General will register the request and will establish a tribunal, unless
the request for arbitration is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of ICSID. Id. The re-
spondent may address objections to the jurisdiction of ICSID pursuant to article 41 of
the Convention. Id.; see also ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 41(2) (providing
that a tribunal must determine whether the objection of a contracting party to the
jurisdiction of ICSID is a preliminary question or part of the merits of the dispute).
Unless the parties do not agree on the number of arbitrators, the tribunal will consist
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tional arbitral awards are final and binding.' Foreign investors rely on
ICSID to enforce tribunal awards, because article 54 of the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States (ICSID Convention) provides that a contracting
state must treat an ICSID award as a final judgment of a court of that
state.4 Similarly, a contracting state expects enforcement of ICSID tri-
bunal awards, because ICSID prevents the foreign investor's home
state from making international claims or intervening through diplo-
matic channels.5
An ad hoc committee, however, pursuant to ICSID rules,' annulled
the ICSID arbitration awards in Amco v. Indonesia7 and Klbckner v.
Cameroon.8 These two annulments of arbitral awards are the only ones
in the history of ICSID. Nevertheless, the annulments aroused consid-
erable controversy about the future of ICSID as an alternative dispute
settlement forum.'
This concern, however, is not entirely justified. Recent developments
within the ICSID system will promote heightened demand for ICSID
arbitration. First, the arbitral tribunals' expansive interpretations of
ICSID jurisdiction in case law increases the willingness of contracting
parties to incorporate ICSID arbitration clauses into their agree-
of three arbitrators. Each party will appoint one arbitrator and the third, who is the
president of the tribunal, is appointed through the agreement of the parties. ICSID
Convention, supra note 1, art. 37(2)(b). If the parties do not appoint arbitrators, then
the President of the World Bank (acting as ex officio chairman of the Administrative
Council of ICSID) appoints the arbitrators. Id. art. 38.
3. See Branson, Annulments of "Final' ICSID Awards Raise Questions About the
Process, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 25 (questioning the finality of international arbi-
tration awards).
4. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 54(1). A contracting state with a federal
constitution may enforce an ICSID award in its federal courts as if it were a final
judgment of the courts of that state. Id.
5. Id. art. 27(1).
6. Id. art. 52.
7. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia (Case No. ARB/81/i), registered Feb. 27, 1981;
Award on the Jurisdiction of Sept. 25, 1983, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 351, 351 (1984)
[hereinafter 1983 Amco Award on Jurisdiction]; Award on the Merits of November
21, 1984, excerpted in 24 I.L.M. 1022, 1022 (1985) [hereinafter 1984 Amco Award on
the Merits]; Decision on Request for Provisional Measures of December 9, 1983, re-
printed in 24 I.L.M. 365, 365 (1985) [hereinafter 1983 Amco Provisional Decision];
Annulment Decision of May 16, 1986, 1 INT'L ARB. REP. 649, 649 (1986) [hereinafter
1986 Amco Annulment Decision].
8. Kl 6ckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon (Case No.
ARB/81/2), registered Apr. 14, 1981; Award of Oct. 21, 1983, excerpts translated in
1 J. INT'L ARB. 145, 145 (1984) [hereinafter 1983 Kl6ckner Decision]; Annulment
Decision of May 3, 1985, excerpts translated in 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 89,
89 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 Kl6ckner Annulment Decision].
9. Branson, supra note 3, at 25.
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ments.10 Second, broad jurisdictional interpretations allow contracting
parties to apply ICSID provisions to a wide range of circumstances,,
Additionally, developments outside the ICSID system will strengthen
the contracting parties' use of ICSID. First, the establishment of the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) promotes ICSID
arbitration, because it insures investors against non-commercial risks
such as expropriation and nationalization. 2 Second, contracting parties
cannot rely on other arbitral tribunals such as the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC) and the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), because they subject arbitration procedures to the control of
the courts of the arbitration forum.13 Contracting parties designate IC-
SID as the forum for settling disputes, preventing a domestic court of
the parties from enforcing its country's laws.' ICSID membership will
therefore continue to increase significantly as constructive develop-
ments continue.15
This article analyzes the developments within and outside the ICSID
system that sustain the demand of contracting parties for ICSID arbi-
tration, despite the ad hoc committees' annulments in Amco v. Indone-
sia and Klbckner v. Cameroon. Part I traces the external developments
of the ICSID system and the internal procedures of ICSID that reduce
the importance of the Amco and Klbckner annulments, allowing for
continued growth of ICSID. Part II discusses ICSID jurisdictional re-
quirements and the case law highlighting these requirements and offers
10. Rand, Hornick & Friedland, ICSID's Emerging Jurisprudence: The Scope of
ICSID's Jurisdiction, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL 33, 61 (1986) [hereinafter Rand,
Hornick & Friedland].
11. Id.
12. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
opened for signature Oct. 11, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1598, 1598 (1985) [herein-
after MIGA Convention]. See Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Invest-
ment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, I ICSID REV. FOREIGN INv. LJ. 1,
13 (1986) [hereinafter Shihata, Roles] (stating that the MIGA Convention will enter
into force upon ratification through five capital-exporting and 15 capital-importing
countries if the subscriptions of these countries amount to one-third of MIGA's author-
ized capital, or approximately $36 million).
13. See Broches, Settlement of Disputes, supra note 2, at 207 (stating that devel-
oping countries prefer not to submit disputes to arbitration where courts of the arbitra-
tion forum review the arbitration procedures).
14. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1) (providing that a tribunal de-
cides disputes according to rules of law upon which the contracting parties agree).
15. See ICSID 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (stating that ICSID membership has in-
creased significantly since its inception). Accord Soley, ICSID Implementation: An Ef-
fective Alternative to International Conflict, 19 INT'L LAW. 521, 528 n.71 (1985)
(showing a 1974 study finding that over 1000 investment contracts incorporated ICSID
dispute resolution procedures and covered approximately S2 billion in international
investments).
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definitions of ambiguous terms for parties negotiating ICSID contracts.
Part III analyzes the effects of the annulment decisions in Klbckner
and Amco and concludes that the demand for ICSID arbitration will
increase regardless of the annulment decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. DEVELOPMENTS EXTERNAL TO THE ICSID SYSTEM
Parties to international investment contracts will continue to utilize
ICSID arbitration clauses because of the lack of alternatives in inter-
national and national law."' There are three main reasons for this pau-
city of alternatives. First, the decisions of national courts usually have
political undertones.1  Consequently, foreign investors perceive the de-
cisions of national courts as unfair and discriminatory.18 Second, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) fails to protect shareholders with
substantial interests in an investment, because the government of the
shareholders cannot pursue the shareholders' claims.19 Third, AAA and
ICC awards are subject to the control of domestic law.20 Consequently,
16. See Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration, 4 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 343-44 (1974) (stating that prior to the establishment of
ICSID, no single forum offered a means of directly settling investment disputes be-
tween a private party and a governmental party).
17. Chong Su Yun, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes -
Commentary and Forecast, 11 MALAYA L. REV. 287, 289 (1969). The executive and
legislative branches of a state pressure the courts to decide cases favorably in the politi-
cal interests of that state. Id. ICSID, however, establishes an autonomous jurisdictional
system. Broches, Settlement of Disputes, supra note 2, at 208. No national authorities
review or supervise ICSID arbitration. Id.
18. Chong Su Yun, supra note 17, at 289.
19. Id. For an investor to seek assistance from his or her government, the investor
must first prove that international law denied the investor justice. Id. The government,
in its discretion, can then pursue the claim through diplomatic notes or it can present a
claim before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Id. The jurisdiction of the ICJ,
however, is limited. See Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 5) (holding that Belgium could not claim diplomatic
protection on behalf of Belgian shareholders who held substantial shares in a Spanish
corporation, because international law authorized only the state of incorporation,
Canada, to make a claim).
In comparison to an investor, a contracting state must recognize and enforce an
ICSID award as if it were a final judgment of its own court. ICSID Convention, supra
note 1, art. 54(1); see also Broches, Settlement of Disputes, supra note 2, at 208 (stat-
ing that each contracting state must recognize an award rendered pursuant to the
ICSID Convention and enforce the pecuniary obligations that the award imposes as if
it were a final judgment from one of its own courts). The contracting state must pre-
sent a certified copy of the ICSID decision to the court that the contracting parties
designated in their contract. Id.
20. Broches, Settlement of Disputes, supra note 2, at 207. The ICC and AAA
settle investment disputes for parties under national law supplemented through a treaty
that recognizes and enforces the arbitral award. Id. Consequently, when parties submit
[VOL. 3:481
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developing countries and their agencies usually disfavor submitting dis-
putes to these arbitral courts.2" Under article 42 of the ICSID Conven-
tion, however, parties have the authority to decide the applicable law
subsequent or prior to a particular investment dispute.
22
Additionally, some external developments indicate that the demand
for ICSID arbitration will increase in the future. First, less developed
countries (LDCs) have shifted demand from foreign borrowing (debt)
to direct foreign investment (equity) as a means of acquiring foreign
hard currency to stimulate their economic development23 and have
thereby ensured the utility of ICSID as a dispute settlement forum.
2 4
In addition, the ICSID Secretariat recently began promotional activi-
ties publicizing ICSID.2 5 These efforts resulted in increased inquiries
regarding information on ICSID, the drafting of ICSID clauses, and
disputes for arbitration to the AAA or ICC, they are subject to the jurisdiction of
foreign courts. Id.
21. Id.; see Haight, International Arbitration, 14 CAsE W. REs. J. INTL L. 253,
255 (1982) (stating that foreign investors are likely to find the domestic courts of de-
veloping countries unacceptable for settling disputes).
22. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1). The ICSID Convention requires
that the tribunal apply rules that the parties previously agreed upon to resolve a dis-
pute. Id. In absence of such an agreement, the tribunal must apply the law of the
contracting state party to the dispute, including its rules on the conflict of laws and
rules of international law. Id. But cf. 1985 K16ckner Annulment Decision, supra note
8, at 112 (establishing a three tier standard of applicable laws to arbitral disputes
where domestic law has first preference. According to the three tier Kl~ckner standard,
tribunals first apply domestic law, and secondly, tribunals fill gaps in domestic law with
international law. Where international law conflicts with domestic law, international
law takes precedence. Id.; see 1986 Amco Annulment Decision, supra note 7, at 654
(stating that the committee's reading of article 42 is contrary to its plain meaning that
will likely result in frustrating the expectations of the host state and thereby discourag-
ing acceptance of ICSID).
23. See United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, Recent Devel-
opments Related to Transnational Corporations and International Economic
Relations, Report of the Secretary General, at 16, U.N. Doc. E.10/1986/2 (stating
that both bank lending to and direct foreign investment in developing countries have
decreased significantly). The LDCs increased their demand for direct foreign invest-
ment because foreign borrowing created debt that the LDCs were unable to service or
repay. Id. Equity investment, however, does not create debt. Statement of the Honora-
ble James A. Baker, Ill, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States Before the
Joint Annual Meeting of the International Monetarty Fund and the World Bank. Oct.
8, 1985, Seoul, Korea, 25 I.L.M. 412, 417. Moreover, equity investment can stimulate
growth and innovation, transfer technology, keep capital in the LDCs, and result in an
alleviation of the long-term debt crisis. Id.
24. See ICSID, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (annex 1) (providing a complete list of
the states that either signed or ratified the Convention). Some Latin American nations
have ratified ICSID, demonstrating that they are changing their hostile attitudes to-
ward international arbitration. Id.
25. ICSID 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 5. The Secretariat has issued new brochures and
publications. Id. at 96. In addition, the Secretariat has participated in seminars and
colloquia relating to arbitration, investments, and finance to reach non-legal profes-
sions. Id.
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the use of ICSID arbitration. These external developments indicate
that ICSID is an expanding institution.
Despite external developments supporting future use of ICSID arbi-
tration, external political factors threaten the future use of ICSID.20
First, states often perceive transnational contracts containing ICSID
clauses as a threat to their sovereignty and the jurisdiction of their na-
tional courts.27 States are inherently unable to accept the principle of
equality of parties.28 Second, LDCs perceive ICSID as a "Western
idea." -2 9 Third, Latin American countries employ the Calvo Doctrine.30
The Calvo Doctrine forbids any foreign state from interfering in the
affairs of Latin American countries. 31 Fourth, Latin American coun-
tries adopted the Andean Foreign Investment Code (Andean Code)
32
26. See Lalive, Some Threats to International Investment Arbitration, I ICSID
REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 26, 34 (1986) (explaining that contracting parties encounter
political problems when using ICSID arbitration).
27. See id. at 33 (explaining that states may perceive that ICSID partly diminishes
their authority and discretion over transnational contracts). A host state that uses
ICSID, however, could increase investments in that state. Id. at 34.
28. Id. at 37. The state as an entity is forced to play two roles in international
arbitration proceedings: one as a state and the other as a contracting party. Id. Neither
industrialized nor developing states can adjust themselves to ICSID as easily as trans-
national corporations. Id. at 36.
Consequently, the state party expects, or even requests, that a tribunal should not
have the ability to grant procedural privileges because the tribunal should put the state
on an equal footing with the investor. Id. at 37. Examples of such state requests include
extensions of or disregard for time limits and derogation of ordinary rules of evidence.
Id. This attitude poses a barrier to future expansion of international arbitration. Id.
Foreign investors may begin to distrust ICSID if arbitral procedures do not recognize
the equality of the parties. Id. If both the state party and investor are reluctant to
arbitrate because of their concern about equality in the settlement of disputes, then the
future success of the arbitral process is uncertain. Id. at 34. This concern, however, is
overemphasized, because the bargaining powers of host states are beginning to equal
those of investors. Gopal, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 591, 593 (1982).
29. Lalive, supra note 26, at 34. The LDCs often maintain the view that ICSID is
a western idea, because the industrialized countries have made greater use of interna-
tional arbitration than LDCs. Id. LDCs maintain that international arbitration serves
only the interests of the industrialized nations. Id. Consequently, LDCs are not pre-
pared to play in an arena where they perceive an inherent disadvantage for themselves.
Id. at 35.
30. See Gopal, supra note 28, at 602 (explaining how Latin American countries
use the Calvo Doctrine as a result of colonialist exploitation).
31. Id. The Calvo Doctrine was the consequence of colonialist investors making
excessive profits without reciprocating sufficient benefits to the state. Id. at 602. Latin
American countries treat foreigners as Latin American citizens in national courts. Id.
ICSID, however, gives foreign investors a legal status different from that of investors in
the host country. Id. Consequently, ICSID squarely opposes the Calvo Doctrine. Id.
Nevertheless, the Calvo Doctrine will continue to impede contracting parties from us-
ing ICSID as a forum for investment disputes. Id at 603.
32. Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Decision No. 109, Andean Foreign
Investment Code, Nov. 30, 1976, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977) [hereinafter
ICSID ANNULMENTS
mandating that courts of the host country have jurisdiction over
investors.
A more positive signal for the future use and effectiveness of ICSID
is that many Latin American countries recently signed the Convention
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA).33 MIGA insures investors against non-commercial risks, such
as expropriation and nationalization. 4 This development indicates that
investors may become more willing to submit disputes to ICSID in the
future."5
B. DEVELOPMENTS INTERNAL TO THE ICSID SYSTEM
In addition to external factors, several developments within ICSID
contribute to its future application and effectiveness. First, the permis-
sive provisions of the ICSID Convention allow a state party and an
investor to depart from certain ICSID contractual provisions."a Conse-
quently, a state and an investor may supplement the ICSID provisions
in their contracts to further accommodate their needs.8 7 Second, the
Andean Code].
33. See Founders of MIGA Define Agency's Politics, World Bank Release, Oct. 7,
1986 [hereinafter World Bank Release] (providing that 44 states, including eleven in-
dustrialized and 33 developing countries, signed the MIGA Convention as of October
7, 1986). Id. Of the 44 states, Barbados, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia have
ratified the MIGA Convention. Id. MIGA will become an independent international
organization once the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency enters into force. See MIGA Convention, supra note 12, art. 61(a) (explaining
the requirements for MIGA to become enforceable).
34. MIGA Convention, supra note 12, art. 11. Article I 1 of the MIGA Convention
covers the following categories of non-commercial risks: (1) the risk from currency
conversion and transfer; (2) the risk of loss from the host government's legislative or
administrative actions which deprive the foreign investor of ownership or control of the
investment; (3) the repudiation of government contracts where the investor has no ac-
cess to a competent forum, unreasonable delays in courts or inability to enforce a final
judicial or arbitral decision; and (4) the risk from armed conflict and civil unrest. Id.
See Shihata, Foreign Investment, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign
Investment. The Role of the World Bank. with Particular Reference to ICSID and
MIGA, I Aht. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 97, 109 (1986) [hereinafter Shihata, Foreign
Investment] (explaining these categories of non-commercial risks).
35. World Bank Release, supra note 33, at 13-25. MIGA compensates the foreign
investor. MIGA Convention, supra note 12, art. 26; see Shihata, Roles, supra note 12,
at 17 (discussing the financing provisions of MIGA). MIGA will vary its premiums
according to the actual risks assumed under its guarantees. Id. After MIGA pays a
claim, it will assume the same rights that the indemnified investor may have acquired
against the host country. Id. MIGA would have recourse to international arbitration to
enforce these rights. See Shihata, Foreign Investment, supra note 34, at 113-14.
36. See Shihata, Foreign Investment, supra note 34, at 104 n.35 (stating that cer-
tain permissive provisions apply only in the absence of agreement between the parties).
37. See Delaume, ICSID Arbitration Practical Considerations, 1 J. INTr'L ARB.
101, 120 n.70 (1984) [hereinafter Delaume, Practical Considerations] (suggesting that
the parties may want to keep the option of seeking interim or conservatory measures,
1988]
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cost of ICSID arbitration is decreasing and its effectiveness is increas-
ing. 8 Although ICSID arbitration has in the past taken a considerable
amount of time, ICSID created measures in 1986 to make arbitration
more efficient.39
Some ICSID decisions, however, appear to make the tribunal's exis-
tence unstable. In Kl6ckner v. Cameroon,40 the arbitral tribunal ac-
cepted the Cameroonian government's designation of a company,
SOCAME, as one of its agencies, even though Cameroon designated
the agency after the initiation of formal arbitration proceedings. 41 This
decision resulted in the investor instituting annulment proceedings.42
Moreover, the tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia asserted jurisdiction over
P.T. Amco, the local subsidiary of a foreign parent corporation,
even though Indonesia and the foreign parent corporation did not
expressly agree to treat the subsidiary as a foreign corporation in the
ICSID contract.43 Consequently, Indonesia requested annulment
including attachment, in domestic courts); Shihata, Foreign Investment, supra note 34,
at 104 (discussing the flexibility of the ICSID proceedings). The parties may determine
the substantive rules that apply to the dispute. Id.; see ICSID Convention, supra note
1, art. 42 (providing that the parties may designate the rules of law that the tribunal
shall use in case of dispute); Gopal, supra note 28, at 595 (discussing provisions that
facilitate the renegotiation of the contracts as the bargaining power of the contracting
party changes).
38. ICSID, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 4. Prior to 1984, ICSID established maximum
fees for arbitrators and ad hoc committee members. Id. at 5. ICSID itself admits that
costs are high. Id. at 4. But see Soley, supra note 15, at 524 (appraising the low cost
of ICSID fees resulting from the actual costs of the subsidized staff).
39. See Gopal, supra note 28, at 594 (concluding that the average ICSID arbitra-
tion settlement takes three years to complete and serves to stagnate the frozen capital
of investors); ICSID, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (stating that the revised Regulations
and Rules further economized time and costs by allowing a "pre-hearing" conference
to exchange information and accelerate fact-finding); 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 5
(1985)(stating that ICSID saves time because it no longer requires that the secretary
of each commission, tribunal and committee attend all the hearings). Also, the regula-
tion revision that requires parties to make quarterly advance payments to cover arbitra-
tion costs serves as a disincentive to bring frivolous time-consuming claims. Id.
40. 1983 Kl6ckner Decision, supra note 8, at 145.
41. Id. at 149-50.
42. Id.
43. 1983 Amco Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 356. he arbitration settle-
ment was the result of a dispute concerning the hotel of a multinational company that
Indonesia expropriated. Id. When Amco Asia Corporation (Amco Asia) applied for
and became a foreign business in Indonesia named P.T. Amco Indonesia (P.T. Amco),
Amco Asia agreed to ICSID arbitration of all disputes between the business and the
government. Id. at 357. P.T. Amco began construction of a hotel on land which was
leased to it by P.T. Wisma Kartika (P.T. Wisma), an Indonesian corporation owned by
an Indonesian army co-operative, INKIPAD (Induk Koperasi Angatan Darat). Id. at
352. As a result of a dispute between P.T. Amco and P.T. Wisma, P.T. Wisma and the
Indonesian army seized the hotel. Id. Amco Asia and P.T. Amco filed a claim for
ICSID arbitration against Indonesia for expropriation of property in the amount of $9
million in 1973. 1984 Amco Award on the Merits, supra note 7, at 1022. Indonesia,
[VOL. 3:481
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proceedings." The ad hoc committee's subsequent annulments of the
tribunal's awards in Klbckner'5 and Amco46 created uncertainty about
the finality of ICSID arbitration awards.
The permissive provisions of the ICSID Convention as well as its
decreased costs heighten the desirability of ICSID arbitration. The de-
cisional case law with regard to annulment proceedings, however, may
inhibit the appeal of ICSID. Despite this restraint, the decisional case
law expanding the range of jurisdictional issues will increase the de-
mand for ICSID arbitration.
II. ESTABLISHING THE JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF
ICSID
The scope of ICSID jurisdiction will have a major impact on the
progress of ICSID. Factors such as the predictability and enforceability
of the tribunal's jurisdiction will determine the willingness of the par-
ties to accept ICSID in the future.4" The jurisdictional question, there-
fore, is crucial to the success of this tribunal.
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that, for the tribunal to
have jurisdiction: (a) a legal dispute must exist; (b) the legal dispute
must arise directly out of an investment; (c) the legal dispute must
arise between a contracting state and a national of another contracting
however, disputed the tribunal's jurisdiction to decide the claim on the basis that P.T.
Wisma was the primary party. 1983 Amco Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at
356. Nevertheless, the tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction over all the parties and
granted the award to Amco Asia. 1984 Amco Award on the Merits, supra note 7, at
1039.
44. 3:2 NEws FROM ICSID 2 (1986); see ICSID Convention, supra note I, art.
52(1) (stating the procedures a party must follow when requesting annulment of an
ICSID award); see also id. art. 52(3) (stating that upon receipt of the request for
annulment, the Chairman of the Administrative Council shall appoint an ad hoc com-
mittee of three persons from the Panel of Arbitrators). The ad hoc committee has the
authority to annul the award, or any part of it, on any of the grounds set forth in
article 52(1). Id. art. 52(1). Indonesia requested an annulment proceeding, because the
tribunal failed to apply the relevant law in Amco. 1986 Amco Annulment Decision,
supra note 7, at 652; see ICSID Convention, supra note I, art. 52(1)(b) (providing
that a party may request annulment of the award on the ground that the tribunal has
manifestly exceeded its powers). The ad hoc committee interpreted article 52(1)(b) to
mean that a tribunal has exceeded its powers when it fails to apply the relevant law.
1986 Amco Annulment Decision, supra note 7, at 655. Indonesia sought the annulment
of the Amco award for failure to state the reasons upon which the tribunal based its
decision. 1986 Amco Annulment Decision, supra note 7, at 652; see ICSID Conven-
tion, supra note 1, art. 52(e) (stating that a party may request annulment of a tribu-
nal's award on the ground that the award fails to state the basis of the decision).
45. 1985 Kl6ckner Annulment Decision, supra note 8, at 166-68.
46. 46. 1986 Amco Annulment Decision, supra note 7, at 671.
47. See Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 3-10 (explaining the voluntary character,
flexibility, and effectiveness of the ICSID system).
1988] 489
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
state; and (d) the parties to the dispute must consent in writing to sub-
mit legal disputes to ICSID.48 The decisions of the tribunal in
Klbckner 9 and AmCo 50 extend the jurisdictional provisions of article
25. These broad interpretations allow parties to include a wider range
of international business contracts within the realm of ICSID. This de-
velopment secures the future growth of ICSID as a forum for invest-
ment disputes. The ambiguity in the language of the ICSID Conven-
tion, however, presents potential problems in establishing jurisdiction.
A. LEGAL DISPUTE
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that ICSID has ju-
risdiction only over a "legal dispute"51 and not over all disputes. 2 The
limitation of ICSID to arbitrate only legal disputes will not necessarily
restrict the growth of ICSID, because the usual role of courts is to rule
on legal disputes. ICSID, moreover, has broadened its role to incorpo-
rate the function of a limited fact-finder.53
The ICSID Convention, however, has neither defined "dispute" nor
"legal dispute. ' 54 The Convention therefore fails to provide guidelines
for parties to an ICSID contract. A clear definition of legal dispute,
therefore, would aid future parties who have agreed to ICSID
arbitration.
1. Suggestions For Defining Legal Disputes
Many investment treaties define the categories of disputes or legal
disputes that could fill in the definitional gaps for ICSID. Most bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITS) and multilateral investment treaties
(MITS) either contain categories of disputes or provide conditions pre-
cedent for recourse to ICSID.5 Parties to an ICSID contract may look
to multilateral and bilateral treaties for examples of model consent
clauses to include in their contracts.
48. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
49. 1983 Kl6ckner Decision, supra note 8, at 145.
50. 1983 Amco Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 8, at 351.
51. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25 (1) (delineating the scope of the
arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention).
52. See Amerasinghe, Submission to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 211, 220 (1973-74)
(describing the ambiguous nature of the term "dispute").
53. See 2:1 NEws FROM ICSID 5 (1985) (stating that the pre-hearing conference
formulated under the revised regulations and rules accelerates the fact-finding process).
54. ICSID Convention, supra note I, art. 25(l). ICSID also excludes factual dis-
putes arising from accounting or fact-finding. Id.
55. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 16-17 (1985).
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a. Categories Of Disputes
Contracting parties may look to certain BITs to help define catego-
ries of disputes. Some BITs define disputes broadly. 6 Broad definitions
give the parties the most flexibility for future, unforeseen developments
in the contractual relationship between the parties.
The BITs of the United States, however, are more limited in defining
the categories of disputes.57 The BITs define investment disputes in va-
rious ways: 1) the involvement of the application of an investment
agreement between ICSID parties; 2) the interpretation or application
of a party's foreign investment grant of an investment to a national or
company; or 3) an alleged breach of any right that the treaty creates
concerning an investment.5 8 These treaties, however, exclude disputes
arising under the export credit, guarantee or insurance programs of the
Export-Import Bank of the United States or other similar agreements
where the parties have stipulated other methods of dispute settlement.59
56. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 22, 1981,
People's Republic of Bangladesh - Belgo - Luxembourg Economic Union, art. 6 (1),
reprinted in Investment Laws of the World 1981 INVESTMENT TREATIES 63 (providing
that parties may submit any investment dispute, except tax disputes, to ICSID
arbitration).
57. See 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID, 16 (1985) (providing examples of BITS of the
United States that curtail true areas of disputes).
58. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Senegal
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement of Investment, Dec. 6, 1983, United States
- Senegal, art. 7(6) reprinted in Investment Laws of the World, 1983 INVESTMENT
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION TREATIES 99 (ICSID ed. 1986); Treaty Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Dec. 3, 1985, Turkey -
United States, art. 6 reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 85 (1986) [hereinafter Turkey - United
States Treaty]. Turkey has signed ICSID, but has not yet deposited its ratification.
List of Contracting States and Signatories of the Convention, June 24, 1987 (ICSID
ed.).
59. See United States - Senegal Treaty, supra note 58, art. 7(6) (excluding dis-
putes arising under the export credit, guarantee or insurance programs of the Export-
Import Bank of the United States, or under other official credit, guarantee or insurance
arrangements pursuant to which the parties have agreed to other means of settling
disputes.) Turkey - United States Treaty, supra note 58, art. 6 (providing that con-
tracting parties may submit disputes to ICSID and arbitration with one year from the
date that the dispute arose, unless the parties previously agreed on other dispute settle-
ment procedures). China also limited disputes between investors and Chinese authori-
ties to disputes concerning the amount of compensation due if China expropriates or
nationalizes companies. Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of In-
vestments, June 4, 1984, Belgo Luxembourg Economic Union - People's Republic of
China, art. 10(3) reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 538, 543 (1985); see also Agreement between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of China for the Promo-
tion of Investments, Oct. 7, 1983, Federal Republic of Germany - People's Republic of
China, art. 4(1) reprinted in Investment Laws of the World, 1983 INVESTMENT PRO-
MOTION AND PROTECTION TREATIES (ICSID ed. 1986) (stating that the People's Re-
public of China may expropriate investments of the investor if expropriation is in the
"public interest"). The Chinese treaty with Germany has a side letter providing for
1988]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Parties to an ICSID contract should consult BITs for examples of cate-
gories of disputes and should clearly define when ICSID applies to the
investments. Some BITs apply to investments the parties made prior to
or after the signature or entry into force of the treaty.60 In other cases,
BITs apply to investments the parties made after the date of signature
or entry into force of the treaty,"' while some BITs apply only to in-
vestments that the host state will approve in the future. 2 This lack of
precision is likely to lead to divergent interpretations and disputes. 3
The Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement (Agreement)""
defines disputes, even though it does not contain an ICSID clause.60
Under the Agreement, disputes occur whenever a party considers that
an actual or proposed measure of the other party or its political subdi-
visions is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of the Agree-
ment. 6 This definition 'of dispute allows a party to claim that even po-
tential measures of the other party that are inconsistent with the
contract can create a dispute.
b. Conditions Precedent
In addition to merely limiting disputes to particular categories, IC-
SID allows contracting parties to incorporate conditions precedent.
Several BITs serve as models to contracting parties desiring to include
Additional Protocol if and when the People's Republic of China adheres to the ICSID
Convention. Id. The provisions in the Chinese treaties with the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, and Belgium that limit investment disputes to the narrow categories
of expropriation and nationalization are not found in other treaties. Id.
60. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 16 (1985); see Agreement between Japan and the Arab
Republic of Egypt concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ment, Jan. 28, 1977, Egypt - Japan, art. 9, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 44, 46 (1979) [here-
inafter Egypt - Japan Treaty]. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, June 11, 1975, Egypt - United Kingdom, art. 13, reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
1470, 1473 (1975) [hereinafter Egypt - United Kingdom Treaty] (providing that the
Agreement applies to investments made while the Agreement is in force and shall con-
tinue to apply to the investments for 10 years after the date of the termination).
61. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 16 (1985); see Egypt - United Kingdom Treaty, supra
note 60, art. 14(2) (providing that investments the parties made while the treaty was in
force should continue in effect for ten years after the termination of the treaty).
62. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 16 (1985); see Agreement for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, July 22, 1975, Singapore - United Kingdom, art. 12 reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. 591 (1972) [hereinafter Singapore - United Kingdom Treaty] (providing
that the provisions of the BIT shall extend only to present or future investments that
the contracting party has or will approve).
63. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 17 (1985).
64. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987, Canada - United
States, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281, 281 (1988).




conditions precedent to the use of ICSID. Many BITs provide, for ex-
ample, that contracting parties must attempt to reach a solution
through negotiations,6 through the exhaustion of local remedies, or
through third party procedures 63 before submitting disputes to ICSID.
If the parties cannot reach a settlement within a specific period through
these procedures, 9 then parties to the BITs may submit the dispute to
ICSID.7 0
The United States model clause provides that either ICSID or the
fact-finding facility of the Additional Facility is the usual framework
for settling disputes.7 1 In practice, however, United States BITs vary
from this proposal.7 2 Parties should avoid employing the Additional Fa-
cility exclusively, because the Facility is not based on a treaty provi-
sion.73 The Facility only gives the ICSID Secretariat the option of us-
ing an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, thereby reducing the effectiveness of
67. 2:1 NEws FROM ICSID 17 (1985); see Turkey - United States Treaty, supra
note 58, arts. 6(2), 7(1) (allowing the parties to negotiate in good faith before submit-
ting disputes to ICSID).
68. 2:1 NEws FROM ICSID 17 (1985); see Turkey - United States Treaty, supra
note 58, art. 6(2) (establishing that parties can settle disputes through mutually agreed
upon non-binding third parties); Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Sri Lanka,
Feb. 13, 1980, 9(l), United Kingdom of Great Britain - Northern Ireland - Republic of
Sri Lanka, reprinted in Investment Laws of the World, 1980 INVESTMENT PROMOTION
AND PROTECTION TREATIES 1 (ICSID ed. 1983) [hereinafter United Kingdom - Sri
Lanka Treaty] (allowing parties to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or ap-
plication of the treaty through diplomatic channels); Egypt - United Kingdom Treaty,
supra note 60, art. 9(l) (same).
69. See 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID, at 17 (1985) (noting that parties usually state
that they will try to settle disputes in a time frame from three months to one year); see
United Kingdom - Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 68, art. 8(3) (allowing parties three
months from the time in which the dispute arises to settle the claim through local
remedies); see also Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Saint Lucia for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments, Jan. 18, 1983, United Kingdom - Saint Lucia, art.
8(1) reprinted in Investment Laws of the World, 1983 INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION TREATIES 1, (ICSID ed. 1986) (providing that parties have three months
for written notification of a claim to settle the claim); Turkey - United States Treaty,
supra note 58, art. 6(3) (allowing parties one year from the time a dispute arises to
settle the dispute, provided that the parties have neither put the dispute through any
other settlement procedure nor brought the dispute before courts, administrative tribu-
nals, or agencies of the contracting party).
70. See 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 17 (1985) (providing that the recourse of ICSID is
possible only when parties to this dispute fail to reach an agreement within three
months through the pursuit of local remedies or otherwise).
71. Golsong, Introductory Note to the Turkey - United States Treaty, 25 I.L.M.
85, 85 (1986). The Additional Facility was set up by the ICSID Administrative Coun-
cil as a framework for dispute settlement in the event that a party is not a member of
the ICSID Convention and cannot invoke ICSID jurisdiction. Id.
72. Id.
73. Golsong, supra note 71, at 86.
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ICSID.74 Negotiators from the United States and other countries be-
came aware of this defect and established provisions in contracts for
the exclusive use of ICSID for arbitral disputes.7 5
The conditions precedent provision that the United Kingdom uses in
its BITs is an example of an ambiguous provision.7 Under the British
version, contracting parties have recourse to ICSID only after they
failed to agree through pursuit of local remedies or "otherwise. '7 7 The
term "otherwise" may mean that exhausting local remedies is not al-
ways an absolute prerequisite to ICSID proceedings. 8
A contracting party, for example, could contend that attempted ne-
gotiations, exchange of correspondence, or even preliminary discussions
could satisfy the conditions precedent provision.7 9 To avoid this prob-
lem, parties to ICSID should state clearly the conditions precedent to
ICSID arbitration.
B. A LEGAL DISPUTE ARISING DIRECTLY OUT OF AN INVESTMENT
The ICSID Convention states that ICSID has jurisdiction only over
those legal disputes that arise directly out of an investment.80 Neither
the Convention nor the legislative history of the Convention define "in-
vestment" or describe the circumstances where a dispute arises directly
out of an investment. 81 Delegates to the preliminary meetings of the
ICSID Convention left the term "investment" undefined after failing to
reach a consensus. 2 Therefore, parties to an agreement must define the
exact meaning of what constitutes a "dispute."
The party with the stronger bargaining power usually prevails in ne-
74. Id.
75. See id. (citing examples of treaties where the United States offers only ICSID
as the model framework for dispute settlement); see United States - Turkey Treaty,
supra note 58, art. 6(3)(c) (limiting dispute settlements to ICSID only); Singapore -
United Kingdom Treaty, supra note 62, art. 8(l) (same); Egypt - Japan Treaty, supra
note 60, art. 11 (allowing ICSID only to settle disputes); Egypt - United Kingdom
Treaty, supra note 60, art. 8(1) (same).
76. See, e.g., United Kingdom - Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 68, art. 8(3) (al-
lowing parties to settle disputes through pursuit of local remedies); Singapore - United
Kingdom Treaty, supra note 62, art. 8(l) (allowing ICSID to settle disputes only after
the parties failed to reach a settlement within three months through local remedies);
Egypt - United Kingdom Treaty, supra note 60, art. 8(1) (allowing parties to settle
disputes through local remedies or conciliation).
77. 2:1 NEws FROM ICSID 17 (1985)
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
81. Amerasinghe, supra note 52, at 223.
82. Gopal, supra note 27, at 598-99.
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gotiating the language on "disputes." 3 Investors from developed coun-
tries are often in stronger bargaining positions. Consequently, these in-
vestors often gain the inclusion of their definition of "dispute" to the
ICSID contract."4 This unequal bargaining situation puts contracting
parties from LDCs at a disadvantage, creating a disincentive for devel-
oping countries to ratify ICSID.
The advantage of a vague term such as "investment" is that it is
flexible and can apply to many different types of agreements." When
the original member states drafted the ICSID Convention, forms of
investment were limited to concessions, establishment agreements, joint
ventures, loans from private financial institutions to foreign public enti-
ties, and agreements concerning foreign property rights.80 Presently,
forms of investment include profit-sharing service and management
contracts, contracts for the sale and construction of industrial plants,
turnkey contracts, international leasing agreements, and especially
agreements for the sale of know-how and technology.8"
The vagueness of the term "investment" enhances the chances of
ICSID becoming a permanent arbitration institution. The flexible ap-
plication of the term "investment" facilitates parties bringing disputes
to ICSID,8 s because the parties can explicitly agree which transactions
constitute "investments" under the ICSID Convention. Parties can also
delineate the nature, scope, and duration of the investment to ensure
83. Id. at 599. Gopal argues that states party to the contract are gaining political
bargaining power in relation to private investors. Id. at 593. As a result, once-powerful
foreign investors no longer have the sole power to dictate the terms of an agreement.
Id.
84. Id. at 593.
85. Golsong, A Guide to Procedural Issues in International Arbitration, 18 INTL
LAW. 633, 634 (1984).
86. Delaume, Practical Considerations, supra note 37, at 117. Investment disputes
have included exploitation of natural resources, such as bauxite mining, oil exploitation
and exploration, forestry exploitation, industrial investments regarding the production
of fibers for exports, or of plastic bottles for domestic consumption, liquification of
natural gas, and the production of aluminum, tourism development in the form of the
construction of hotels, and urban development in the form of housing construction. Id.
at 118.
87. Id. at 117. Modern types of investments include those for the construction of a
chemical plant on a turn-key arrangement, with a management contract providing
technical assistance for the operation of the plant, a management contract for the oper-
ation of a cotton mill, a contract for converting vessels into fishing vessels and training
crews, and technical and licensing agreements for the manufacturing of weapons. Id.
The only dispute where a state brought an action against the investor involved the
construction of a maternity ward. Id.; see Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts,
77 Am. J. INT'L L. 784, 795 (1983) [hereinafter Delaume, Courts] (explaining various
types of investments).
88. Delaume, Practical Considerations, supra note 37, at 117.
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that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction.8 9 The scope of ICSID could
widen as new types of "investments" fall under its jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, the term "investment" adapts easily to a changing invest-
ment climate.91
The ICSID Secretariat reports that most parties do not clarify
whether the underlying relationship constitutes an investment.92 These
omissions in drafting can hinder the effectiveness of ICSID, because
disputes over the definition of investment arise easily. To increase the
efficiency of ICSID, the parties should clearly define what constitutes
an investment. The Secretary General of ICSID has not yet had a
problem requesting the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, because the
investment dispute lacked specificity. The Secretary General has, how-
ever, warned companies engaging either in public works with certain
nations or in systematic transfers of technology to those nations to ex-
pressly define these activities as investments. 3 Parties to an ICSID
contract would greatly benefit from guidelines that delineate whether
specific transactions fall outside the purview of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal.9
1. Suggestions For Defining Investment
Many BITs provide the extensive guidance that contracting parties
need to define clearly the term "investment." Some BITs define invest-
ment broadly.9 5 One BIT, for example, defines "capital investment" as
the contribution in achieving an economic objective.96 This contribution
89. Delaume, Courts, supra note 87, at 796. Pursuant to article 25(4) of the
ICSID Convention, the state party may specify what types of disputes it will include
and exclude from ICSID arbitration. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(4). To
date, three states have excluded certain investment disputes from ICSID arbitration.
Delaume, Courts, supra note 87, at 796. Saudi Arabia excluded disputes over "oil and
pertaining to acts of sovereignty." Id. Guyana and Jamaica have excluded disagree-
ments over "minerals and other natural resources." Id. Additionally, Papua-New-
Guinea specified that it will only submit those disputes that are "fundiamental to the
investment itself." Id.; see Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 5 (describing classes of
disputes that states excluded from ICSID arbitration).
90. Delaume, Courts, supra note 87, at 795.
91. Id.
92. See Delaume, Practical Considerations, supra note 37, at 119 (indicating that
parties should accurately define "investment"); see also Delaume, Courts, supra note
87, at 795 (reminding parties to ICSID clauses of the importance of recording salient
features of a transaction).
93. Delaume, Practical Considerations, supra note 37, at 119.
94. Gopal, supra note 28, at 599-600.
95. See 2:1 NEws FROM ICSID 19 (1985) (stating that most BITs contain exten-
sive interpretations of the term "investment").
96. Agreement Between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania and
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Sudan on the Mutual Promotion and
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consists of all goods, services, and financial means of the parties to the
investment.97
Most BITs, however, use an extensive list of specific categories to
define investment 8 The BITs of the United Kingdom"9 and the United
States, 100 for example, define investments in this manner. The BITs of
the United States, however, do not simply list categories of invest-
ments. To cover investments that may eventually change forms, the
treaties provide that any alteration of the form of the investment where
a party invests or reinvests assets should not affect the prior classifica-
tion as investments. 0 1
MITs also provide sources to derive a definition of investment. First,
the Andean Code provides extensive categories of the term "direct for-
eign investment."'1 2 Article 1 of the Andean Code defines investment
broadly, 0 3 but the Code's annex narrows the definition to specific cate-
Guarantee of Capital Investments, Dec. 8, 1978, Socialist Republic of Romania - Dem-
ocratic Republic of Sudan, art. 2(a), reprinted in INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD 1,
2 (ICSID ed. 1983) [hereinafter Romania-Sudan Treaty].
97. Id.
98. See 2:1 NEvs FROM ICSID 19 (1985) (providing examples of BITs that list
investments by categories).
99. See Egypt - United Kingdom Treaty, supra note 60, art. l(a) (including the
following assets as investments: immovable and movable property, stocks and deben-
tures, companies' claims to money under a contract, intellectual property rights, and
business concessions); United Kingdom - Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 68, art. 1(a)
(same); Singapore - United Kingdom Treaty, supra note 62, art. 1(a) (same). Other
BITs define investments as every kind of asset including, though not limited to, the
following categories: property and property rights such as mortgages, liens, or pledges;
shares, stock, and debentures of companies; claims to money or to any performance
under contract with a financial value; intellectual property rights and good will; and
concession rights for exploring, cultivating, extracting, and exploiting natural resources.
Egypt - United Kingdom Treaty, supra note 60, art. 1 (a); Sri Lanka - United Kingdom
Treaty, supra note 68, art. 1(a); Singapore - United Kingdom Treaty, supra note 62,
art. 1(a).
100. Turkey -United States Treaty, supra note 58, art. 1(1). The Turkey - United
States Treaty defines an investment as every kind of investment in the territory of a
party which nationals or companies of the other party directly or indirectly control. Id.
Under the treaty, investments include assets, equity, debt, claims, and service and in-
vestment contracts. Id. Further definitions of investments include the following: intel-
lectual and industrial property rights including rights with reference to copyrights, pat-
ents, trademarks, trade names, industrial designs, trade secrets, know-how, and
goodwill; and any rights, licenses, and permits; reinvestment of returns; and principal
interest payments arising under loan agreements. Id.
101. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 20 (1985); see Turkey - United States Treaty, supra
note 58, art. 1(3) (stating that any alteration where assets are invested or reinvested
shall not change their character as investment).
102. Andean Code, supra note 32, Annex No. I, § 11(b).
103. See id. art. 1 (delineating direct foreign investment). Article I defines direct
foreign investment as contributions from abroad from foreign natural or juridical per-
sons to the capital of an enterprise. Id. In addition, the Andean Code defines direct
foreign investments to include investments in national currency from funds transferred
1988]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
gories.10 The precise annex specifications allow parties to know exactly
what types of investments their contract covers.
The intentional failure of the MIGA Convention to define "invest-
ment" allows newly emerging forms of industrial cooperation to fall
within the scope of MIGA.103 Investments under the MIGA Conven-
tion, however, consist of equity interests,108 equity-type loans,107 and
forms of direct investment.10 8 The MIGA Convention may eventually
extend to other medium or long-term forms of investment, if that eq-
uity interest or direct investment relates to the loans.109 Only new in-
vestments are eligible for guarantees under the MIGA Convention.'1
That is, resources must transfer from abroad into the host country after
applying for MIGA Convention coverage.11 Moreover, the investor
must make the investment in the territory of a member country.
112
C. CONSENT IN WRITING To SUBMIT To THE JURISDICTION OF
ICSID
Consent to ICSID jurisdiction is voluntary.113 Ratification of the IC-
SID Convention does not obligate the ratifying state to submit invest-
ment disputes to ICSID arbitration. 14 Likewise, an investor from a
and reinvested abroad.
104. Id. Annex No. 1, § II(b). Investment, as defined under the Andean Code,
constitutes financial resources in foreign exchange or credit, including currency where
the country makes the investment, capital of both national and foreign origin, credit
from a parent company and other sources, and actual interest the foreign company
pays on credit. Id. This definition also includes physical or tangible resources, such as
industrial plants, new and reconditioned machinery and equipment, spare parts, loose
parts and pieces, raw materials, and intermediate products. Id. The annex further de-
lineates investment as resources derived from technology or intangibles, such as trade-
marks, industrial designs, management capacity, technical know-how, patented or not
patented, and possible alternative know-how. Id. The working apparatus, technical doc-
uments, and instructions can constitute technical know-how. Id.
105. Voss, Introductory Note to MIGA Convention, 24 I.L.M. 1598, 1600 (1985).
[hereinafter Voss, Introductory Note].
106. MIGA Convention, supra note 12, ch. 3, at 12. Equity interests include port-
folio equity investments. Voss, Introductory Note, supra note 105, at 1600.
107. MIGA Convention, supra note 12, ch. 3, art. 12. Equity-type loans include
medium or long-term loans that owners of equity in the enterprise make or guarantee.
Voss, Introductory Note, supra note 105, at 1600.
108. MIGA Convention, supra note 12, ch. 3, art. 12.
109. Voss, Introductory Note, supra note 105, at 1600.
110. Id.
111. MIGA Convention, supra note 12, ch. 3, art. 12.
112. Id. ch. 3, art. 14.
113. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at preamble.
114. See Vuylsteke, supra note 16, at 348 (stating that a contracting state is not
obligated to submit any particular dispute to ICSID merely because the contracting
state is a member of ICSID); see also Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that
an obligation to use ICSID arises only after the contracting state has specifically
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contracting state need not use the ICSID Convention for a particular
dispute.'1 5 The host state and the foreign investor must specifically con-
sent to ICSID jurisdiction." 6 The contracting parties can require, as a
condition of their consent, the exhaustion of local administrative and
judicial remedies and can determine the applicable rules of law specifi-
cally through agreement. 1 '
The ICSID Convention does not state what effect exhausting local
remedies as a precondition to arbitration will have on arbitration.1 18 It
is not certain, for example, whether the arbitrators will review the fair-
ness of the local process, or whether they will totally ignore the local
process if the investor rejects the validity of the local proceedings."'
The ICSID Convention leaves these questions unanswered to give the
parties flexibility in structuring agreements as they desire. 2
This kind of flexibility also builds an inherent instability into the
ICSID Convention. Once a dispute arises where neither the ICSID
Convention nor the parties have determined the rules in the event of an
unfair local proceeding, the tribunal is free to decide the rules in any
manner it wishes. Excessive flexibility may defeat ICSID's purpose in
providing an efficient dispute settlement process.121 If parties are aware
of the gaps in ICSID and provide clauses filling in gaps, then the lack
of a definitive rule will not deter parties from using ICSID in the
future.1
22
Parties to an ICSID contract that condition their consent on ex-
hausting local, administrative, and judicial remedies should include
clauses that allow arbitrators to review the fairness of the local pro-
ceedings. 2 ' These clauses should detail the criteria of a fair proceeding
on which the arbitrators can base their decisions.1 2' Currently, BITs
fail to provide models for this type of provision.
agreed to submit a dispute to ICSID arbitration).
115. Vuylsteke, supra note 16, at 348. The parties can consent to the jurisdiction of
ICSID generally, with respect to a particular investment, or with respect to all invest-
ments. Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 4.
116. See Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that the decision of a con-
tracting state to consent to ICSID arbitration is within the sole discretion of each
state).
117. Vuylsteke, supra note 16, at 350.
118. Gopal, supra note 28, at 600.
119. Id.
120. See id. (stating that the main reason for giving the parties the freedom to
exhaust local remedies as a precondition to arbitration is that many countries may not
join the ICSID Convention without this freedom).
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1. The Form of the Consent
The ICSID Convention specifies that the parties must consent in
writing to ICSID arbitration, but does not elaborate on the form this
writing must take. 2 5 The parties must determine the form of their con-
sent.12 The parties may express their consent in an ICSID arbitration
clause within the investment agreement, on an ad hoc basis when a
dispute arises, or in an exchange of letters or other documents.' 2'
The contracting state may offer consent either in its national legisla-
tion or in a BIT with the home state of the investor.'2 8 The contracting
state may agree, in advance, to submit investment disputes to ICSID
arbitration. The consent of the contracting state becomes binding, how-
ever, when the investor subsequently agrees to settle the dispute in this
fashion. 29 ICSID may record the acceptance of the investor when the
investment occurs or later when the investor requests ICSID arbitra-
tion. 30 The ICSID Convention allows the investor to bring a claim
before ICSID without the consent of the home state of the investor, so
long as the home state of the investor ratified the ICSID Convention.'
ICSID arbitration is more effective for the investor than the other
more cumbersome remedies under international law, where only the
state, not the injured national, can bring an action. 32 In contrast, an
ICSID consent clause in an investment contract creates international
obligations. Once a state and contracting party consent to ICSID juris-
diction, then their agreement is irrevocable. 133 The contracting state,
therefore, cannot refuse to or abstain from participating in the ICSID
proceedings and must recognize and enforce an ICSID arbitration
award.13
125. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
126. See ICSID MODEL CLAUSES Cl. III, at 6 (1981) (providing sample arbitration
clauses permitting conditions to consent to ICSID).
127. Delaume, Practical Considerations, supra note 37, at 104; see Delaume,
Courts, supra note 87, at 792 (stating that consent may also result from the unilateral
offer of one party that the other party may subsequently accept).
128. Delaume, Courts, supra note 87, at 792.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 792-93.
131. Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 10-11.
132. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of Feb. 5) (determining that Belgium could not claim diplomatic protection
on behalf of its Belgian shareholders who held substantial shares in a Spanish corpora-
tion, because international law authorized only the state of incorporation, Canada, to
make a claim).
133. See Vuylsteke, supra note 16, at 349 (stating that parties initiating ICSID
proceedings set in motion the self-contained system of ICSID that obligates the parties
to perform their ICSID contract).
134. See Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 7 (stating that ICSID assures both the
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Disputes are likely to occur when parties consent to several contracts
that extend over many years, and when not all of the contracts contain
ICSID arbitration clauses. For example, in Klbckner v. Cameroon, the
parties included ICSID clauses in the initial Protocol of Agreement, 35
a turnkey contract, 138 and an establishment agreement'37 for the con-
struction of a fertilizer factory. Four years later, the parties annexed a
management contract to the establishment agreement that did not con-
tain an ICSID consent clause, but instead referred disputes to the
Rules of Arbitration of the ICC. 38 The ICSID tribunal asserted juris-
diction over the management issues, even though the initial Protocol of
Agreement between the parties did not specifically include ICSID ju-
risdiction over the management contract.13 9 The tribunal held that the
management contract was part of the true overall relationship between
the parties and that the parties in effect agreed to implement the Proto-
col of Agreement through the management contract.1 40 An opposite in-
terpretation would contradict the binding force of consent to ICSID
jurisdiction.1
41
Similarly, the tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia did not require that the
parties express their consent in writing., 2 The government of Indonesia
argued that the ICSID tribunal lacked jurisdiction over Indonesia, be-
cause the arbitration clause in the investment application failed to ex-
pressly designate the investor as a party. 143 The tribunal disagreed and
ruled that formal consent was not necessary. 4 4 Because the investment
agreement was in writing and contained consent to ICSID arbitra-
tion,"4 5 the tribunal concluded that the parties agreed to ICSID
investor and the contracting state that neither party can unilaterally revoke its
consent).
135. 1983 Kl6ckner Decision, supra note 8, at 147. Under the Protocol of Agree-
ment, Kl ckner was to supply and erect a fertilizer factory with a production capacity
of 157,000 tons per year. Id. Article 9 of the Protocol provided that Klackner was
responsible for the technical and commercial management of the Cameroonian joint
venture company (SOCAME), under a management contract for at least 5 years from
its inception. Id.
136. Id. The turnkey contract specifically detailed the supply of the factory, the
definition of guarantee test runs and acceptance procedures, and terms of payment. Id.
137. Id. at 147-48. The establishment agreement gave SOCAME guarantees pur-
suant to the Cameroonian Investment Code, providing for favorable tax and customs
treatment. Id.
138. Id. at 148.
139. Id. at 150.
140. 1:2 NEws FROM ICSID 8 (1984).
141. Id. at 151.
142. 1984 Amco Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 370.
143. 1981 Amco Decision, supra note 7, at 358.
144. Id. at 359.
145. Id. at 360-61.
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arbitration. 1 6
2. Scope of Irrevocability and Abstention
Once the parties consent to ICSID arbitration, neither side may uni-
laterally revoke the consent, 1, 7 even if one of the contracting states
withdraws from the ICSID Convention.' 4 8 In Alcoa v. Jamaica'4 9 the
ICSID arbitral tribunal upheld the principle that the jurisdiction of
ICSID is irrevocable and reaffirmed the principle that a party may not
unilaterally withdraw its consent to arbitration. 50 A party can only
limit its consent with respect to potential future investors."' Some
commentators have noted that any other ruling would deprive ICSID
of any practical value.'52
Consent of the contracting parties insulates them from local judicial
scrutiny. 53 As a result, the consent provision prevents the investment
dispute from becoming a political conflict.' Contracting states, how-
146. Id. at 377.
147. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1) (providing that contracting
parties may not withdraw consent unilaterally when they have given their consent);
Shihata, Roles, supra note 12, at 7 (highlighting the importance of the rule that par-
ties may not unilaterally revoke consent once given in the context of disputes between
foreign investors and Jamaica); see also Soley, supra note 15, at 524 (stating that
ICSID exercises full control over the dispute until a domestic court of a member nation
recognizes and enforces a final award).
148. Vuylesteke, supra note 16, at 348; see ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art.
72 (stating that every member state must fulfill obligations prior to its withdrawal from
the Convention).
149. See Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes: Implications of the Decisions on Jurisdiction in
Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, 17 HART. INT'L L. J. 90, 90 (1976) [hereinafter 1977
Alcoa Minerals Decision] (analyzing the decision in the Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica
case).
150. 1975 Alcoa Minerals Decision, supra note 149, at 102-03. In this case, Alcoa,
an American mining company entered into a twenty-five year agreement with Jamaica
to construct an aluminum refining plant in exchange for major tax concessions and
long-term leases'on bauxite mining. Id. at 93-95. Six years later Jamaica significantly
increased Alcoa's taxes and Alcoa, claiming that this action violated their agreement,
requested ICSID arbitration. Id. Although Jamaica argued that ICSID did not have
jurisdiction as a result of the investment's relation to mineral resources, the tribunal
nevertheless asserted jurisdiction. Id. Jamaica and Alcoa subsequently settled their dif-
ferences. ICSID, 1981 FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 34-39.
151. Soley, supra note 15, at 530.
152. See Rand, Hornick & Friedland, supra note 10, at 60 (stating that for the
tribunal to hold otherwise would be against good faith and the reasonable intent of the
parties).
153. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 26; see 1:1 NEws FROM ICSID 7
(1984) (stating that the rationale behind article 26 is to conclude arbitrations even if
one party abstains); see also Soley, supra note 15, at 532-33 (claiming that adherence
of the United States to the ICSID Convention is analogous to adherence to a treaty).
154. See Soley, supra note 15, at 533 (explaining that the rule of abstention as-
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ever, may exclude certain types of disputes they consider non-arbitrable
under ICSID.1
55
The Rules for Arbitration Proceedings' apply automatically to IC-
SID arbitrations if the parties do not agree on other procedures.
1 57 If
one of the parties institutes proceedings in a local court contrary to the
rules of ICSID, then the other party can institute ICSID proceed-
ings.1"8 If this situation occurs, the Chairman of the Administrative
Council of ICSID is responsible for organizing the arbitral tribunal."0 "
Under the Judicial Abstention doctrine, the local court should then
stay the proceedings and refer the parties to ICSID to seek a jurisdic-
tional ruling from ICSID. 60
The ICSID rules differ from those of other arbitration institutions
whose rules incorporate domestic law."6' According to the rules of the
ICC and AAA, requests for interim measures of protection from a ju-
dicial authority remain compatible with the arbitration agreement. In
contrast, the exclusive character of consent to ICSID arbitration im-
plies that the parties waive their right to seek provisional measures in
other fora. 162 If the parties to an ICSID agreement wish to retain the
option of seeking judicial assistance, they must expressly agree to do
this in their contract.16 3 The effectiveness of ICSID,'" however, de-
pends on the willingness of the contracting parties to relinquish re-
course to the courts and avail themselves of the ICSID Model
Provisions. 60
sures the parties that their dispute is free from outside scrutiny and influences).
155. See Amerasinghe, supra note 52, at 221-22 (discussing disputes some con-
tracting states consider non-arbitrable).
156. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, ICSID/15, Part D,
Rule 6(1) (1985).
157. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 44.
158. See Soley, supra note 15, at 534-35 (discussing the decision in MINE v.
Guinea holding that ICSID is an autonomous international organization).
159. See Vuylsteke, supra note 16, at 351 (noting that when one party to a con-
tract refuses to cooperate, the Administrative Council of ICSID can, at the request of
either party, form a tribunal); see also ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 38 (giving
the chairman of the Administrative Council the authority to appoint the arbitrators).
160. 1:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 4 (1984).
161. 2:2 NEWS FROM ICSID 6 (1985).
162. 1:1 NEws FROM ICSID 4 (1984).
163. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 26. If ICSID determines that it cannot
entertain the suit under the Convention a domestic court may have an independent
basis of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter of the dispute. 1:1 NEws FROM
ICSID 7 (1984).
164. See 3:2 NEWS FROM ICSID 4 (1986) (summarizing the cases that have af-
firmed the judicial abstention principle).
165. See ICSID MODEL CLAusEs, supra note 126, cl. XIV, XVI, at 13-14 (provid-
ing model clauses for a host state to make its consent prior to exhausting its local
remedies and for local legal or judicial authorities to order provisional measures, such
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Courts have applied the abstention rule in several cases. The first
case where a court withheld a judgment was Atlantic Triton Company
Limited v. Peoples' Revolutionary Republic of Guinea. 6' Atlantic Tri-
ton instituted attachment proceedings relating to property of Guinea in
France."8 7 The Court of Appeal of Renne, France applied the judicial
abstention rule and vacated the orders of attachment. 88
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
the Court of First Instance of Antwerp, and the Tribunal of First In-
stance of Geneva all reaffirmed the abstention rule in MINE v.
Guinea.'69 MINE, a Liechtenstein corporation, and the Republic of
Guinea entered into a contract expressly providing for ICSID arbitra-
tion.' 70 A dispute terminated the contract, and Guinea refused to coop-
erate in a settlement. 1 1 The corporation sued Guinea in a United
States court to enforce arbitration before the AAA.
Although the United States district court in MINE granted an order
compelling arbitration, holding that consent to ICSID arbitration con-
stituted a waiver of sovereign immunity, 17 2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision.' 7 3 The
court of appeals held that the district court lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the dispute and could not compel ICSID arbitration.7 4
The Courts in Antwerp and Geneva reasoned in the same manner and
as attachment, before agreeing to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration); see also 2:2
NEws FROM ICSID 4 (1985) (commenting that parties would avoid much trouble and
expense if they paid greater attention to drafting matters and incorporated ICSID
model clauses).
166. Atlantic Triton Company Ltd. v. Peoples' Revolutionary Republic of Guinea
(Case No. ARB/84/1), registered Jan. 19, 1984; Decision on Provisional Measures of
Dec. 18, 1984 (unpublished) reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 340 (1985) [hereinafter 1984 Pro-
visional Decision].
167. 1984 Provisional Decision, supra note 166, at 340.
168. Id. at 341.
169. Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Government of
the Republic of Guinea (Case No. ARB./84/4), registered Sept. 18, 1984; Decision on
Provisional Measures of Dec. 4, 1985 (unpublished) excerpts translated into English in
3:2 NEws FROM ICSID 4-7 (1986) [hereinafter MINE v. Guinea, in NEws FROM
ICSID]; In re Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, 505 F. Supp. 141
(D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815
(1983), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1355 (1982), as amended, 22 I.L.M. 86 (1983).
170. MINE v. Guinea in NEws FROM ICSID, supra note 169, at 4.
171. Id.
172. In re Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, 505 F. Supp. 141,
142-43 (D.D.C. 1981), revd, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
815 (1983).
173. In re Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1099




refused to attach Guinean property in Europe.17 5 This case demon-
strates a commitment on the part of courts in the United States,
Belgium and Switzerland to recognize the autonomy of ICSID. 10
These rulings affirming the exclusive jurisdiction of ICSID and assur-
ing the contracting parties that their dispute is free from political con-
flicts add to the stability of ICSID as a dispute resolution mecha-
nism.1 77 The parties to an ICSID contract will best maintain certainty
through designating, in clear and express language, all consenting par-
ties and contracts that require ICSID arbitration.
D. NATIONALITY OF THE PARTIES
Courts in most countries apply the abstention rule and defer to IC-
SID arbitration. Contracting parties, however, must first establish their
nationalities before an ICSID tribunal will hear a dispute. ICSID has
jurisdiction over the parties when a legal dispute arises between a con-
tracting state and a national of another contracting state.178 Determin-
ing jurisdiction, however, creates the problem of defining both a gov-
ernmental party and a foreign investor. This definitional problem and
the resultant issues merit discussion because of the arbitral tribunals'
broad interpretations of the nationality of ICSID contracting parties.
1. Nationality of a Governmental Party
The nationality of a government is easy to determine. The problem
arises, however, when a host government wants its subdivision or
agency to become a party to a contractual agreement. The ICSID Con-
vention requires that the host state designate the subdivision or agency
to ICSID.'7 9 The host state must then consent to ICSID's jurisdiction
over the subdivision or agency."'
KIckner v. Cameroon1 81 raised the issue of whether ICSID had ju-
risdiction over a government agency. In Klbckner, the tribunal ac-
cepted the Cameroonian government's designation of a company as an
175. See 3:2 NEws FROM ICSID 4 (1986) (stating that the Court of First Instance
of Antwerp and the Tribunal of First Instance of Geneva reaffirmed the rule of "judi-
cial abstention" for attachment matters in MINE v. Guinea).
176. Soley, supra note 15, at 534.
177. Id. at 533.
178. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
179. Id.
180. Id. art. 25(3); see Amerasinghe, supra note 52, at 224 (articulating the proce-
dures a state must follow in designating an agency and consenting to ICSID's
jurisdiction).
181. 1983 Kl6ckner Decision, supra note 8, at 145-49.
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agent of Cameroon, even though Cameroon designated the agency rela-
tionship after the ICSID proceedings began.182 In analyzing the actual
intent of the parties, the arbitral tribunal utilized a flexible rather than
a strict interpretation of article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 183
Such an interpretation may help parties gain confidence in the consis-
tency and practicality of ICSID's decision-making.
Parties to an ICSID contract, desiring to define governmental party
according to the real intent of the parties, should incorporate a flexible
definition of this term into their contract. A few BITs, for example,
refer to agencies of a contracting state as potential parties to disputes
between nationals of the other contracting state. 8 4 Some BITs of the
United States provide that they apply to the political subdivisions of
the contracting parties. 185
2. Nationality of an Investor
ICSID establishes jurisdiction over an investor only if the investor is
a national of an ICSID contracting state. 186 Jurisdiction extends to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a con-
tracting state and a natural or juridical person who has the nationality
of a contracting state other than the state involved in the dispute.
87
The natural person, nonetheless, may have the dual nationality of the
contracting state as well as the nationality of the natural person's
state.'88
Conversely, a juridical person must have the nationality of a state
that is a party to the ICSID Convention. 89 The juridical person can
either incorporate or establish its seat in the state whose nationality it
wants to acquire.190 If the parties agree to treat a juridical person
under foreign control as a national of another contracting state, then
the juridical person is a foreign national for purposes of the ICSID
Convention.19' The ICSID tribunal established this rule because host
182. Id. at 151-52.
183. Id. at 151.
184. Agreement for the Protection and Development of the Capital Investments
Between the Ivory Coast and the Republic of Italy, July 23, 1969, art. 7, reprinted in
Investment Laws of the World, 1969 INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF
TREATIES 32, 34 (ICSID ed. 1983).
185. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 17 (1985).
186. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
187. Id.
188. Id.





states frequently insist that the subsidiaries of the foreign investors
channel their investments through companies incorporated in the host
state.192
Determining the nationality of a juridical person was the issue raised
in MINE v. Guinea.93 MINE is incorporated in a state that is not a
contracting state.194 MINE argued in the Court of First Instance of
Antwerp and the Tribunal of First Instance of Geneva that the charac-
terization of the company as "Swiss" was invalid, because it exceeded
the scope of article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.93 MINE ar-
gued further that the scope of article 25(2)(b) should not extend to
companies that are incorporated in a third state, of which neither the
company nor the host state is a national.196 Guinea argued that parties
to a contractual agreement containing an ICSID clause are free to de-
termine the nationality of the investor under the liberal consent feature
of the ICSID Convention.9 7
To date, neither party has submitted this issue to ICSID and, conse-
quently, this issue is still unresolved. Nevertheless, this issue highlights
the implications for the future use of ICSID. A narrow interpretation
of the MINE dispute suggests that parties incorporating in third states
may be unable to use ICSID. The legislative history of ICSID, how-
ever, shows that each contracting state should determine the nationality
of a company at the time it agrees to ICSID arbitration, regardless of
the company's place of incorporation."9 8 Parties have not yet brought
other nationality cases before ICSID. Another unresolved issue is
whether a contracting party may incorporate in a third state and still
fall within the scope of article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.
The general rule of the ICSID Convention is to prohibit countries
and investors of the same nationality from using international arbitra-
tion. 99 Therefore, the agreement to treat a foreign controlled national
as a national of the host state is an exception to the general rule.210
192. Delaume, Practical Considerations, supra note 37, at 112.
193. MINE v. Guinea in NEws FROM ICSID, supra note 169, at 4.




198. Delaume, Practical Considerations, supra note 37, at 114 n.43.
199. ICS1D Convention, supra note I, art. 25(2)(b).
200. Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum v. Government of Morocco (Case No.
ARB/72/1), registered Jan. 13, 1972; Decision on Jurisdiction of Jul. 1, 1973; Proce-
dural Order of Oct. 17, 1978 (unpublished); see P. Lalive, The First World Bank Arbi-
tration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco) - Some Legal Problems, 51 BRaIT. Y.B. INI'L L.
123, 123 (1980) [hereinafter Holiday Inns Decision in Legal Problems]; see also
Ameransinghe, supra note 52, at 220 (admitting the existence of an implicit agreement
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Recognizing such an exception further shows the flexibility that ICSID
allows parties to have in investment agreements. This flexibility will
encourage more parties to use ICSID in the future.
The decision in Holiday Inns v. Morocco0 1 illustrates the exception
to the general rule that prohibits countries and investors with the same
nationality from using ICSID arbitration. The tribunal determined that
the date of submission to arbitration is the date that determines the
nationality of a corporation.202 The parties in Holiday Inns had not
expressly agreed to treat the subsidiaries as foreign nationals when they
submitted to ICSID's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the tribunal held that
an implied agreement to treat subsidiaries as foreign nationals is ac-
ceptable if the circumstances exclude any other interpretation of the
intentions of the party.
203
The tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia also adopted this solution .2 0 De-
spite the absence of an express agreement to treat the subsidiary as a
foreign corporation, the tribunal asserted jurisdiction over both the for-
eign parent corporation, Amco Asia, and the local subsidiary, P.T.
Amco.2 °5 Moreover, the tribunal rejected the claim of Indonesia that
the parties must have an express agreement to name the subsidiary of
the corporation that is a party to an ICSID contract. 0 6 Instead, the
tribunal focused on the "common will of the parties.
210 7
With this principle in mind, the tribunal in Amco examined the Ap-
plication for Establishment that the foreign parent corporation, Amco
Asia, submitted to Indonesia.20 The tribunal determined that the sub-
sidiary, P.T. Amco, was a foreign business in the Application for Es-
tablishment. 209 The tribunal concluded that the contracting state, Indo-
nesia, was fully aware that P.T. Amco was a foreign national despite
its Indonesian nationality.210 Based on these circumstances, the tribunal
concluded that the government agreed to treat P.T. Amco as a foreign
national.11 Moreover, the tribunal concluded that this agreement was
between the parties if foreign control is sufficiently apparent).
201. Holiday Inns Decision in Legal Problems, supra note 200, at 141.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see 1:2 NEws FROM ICSID 18 (1984) (discussing the elements oF identi-
fying the parties to an ICSID arbitration).
204. See 1983 Amco Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 356-64 (establishing
jurisdiction over P.T. Amco).
205. Id. at 363-64.
206. Id. at 361.
207. Id. at 359.
208. Id. at 360.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 361.
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express and not implied.212
The tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia again took an economic view in
asserting jurisdiction over Amco Asia, the foreign parent. 13 Indonesia
contended that the Application for Establishment did not grant Amco
Asia the right to invoke ICSID arbitration against Indonesia.214 The
Application for Establishment, therefore, did not constitute an express
consent in writing of the jurisdiction of ICSID over any claim of Amco
Asia against Indonesia. 21 '5 The tribunal held that Amco Asia channeled
its investment through its subsidiary.18 The tribunal looked beyond the
arbitration clause in the Application for Establishment that on its face
only applied to the subsidiary and concluded that Amco Asia was the
real investor that the arbitration clause protected.1 The tribunal pre-
ferred to examine the real intent of the parties, instead of applying the
exception to article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. 1 8
The tribunal in Amco expanded its jurisdiction even further to Pan
American, a local Indonesian corporation to which the subsidiary P.T.
Amco ceded a portion of Amco Asia's stock.219 Indonesia contended
that the contracting parties did not include Pan American in the Appli-
cation for Establishment. 220 Further, Indonesia contended that in the
absence of the parties' express consent in writing to the jurisdiction of
ICSID over any claim of Pan American against Indonesia, ICSID
failed to establish jurisdiction over Pan American and, therefore,21
Pan American had no right to invoke the ICSID arbitration clause in
the Application for Establishment.222 The tribunal, however, held that
the ICSID arbitration clause protected Pan American, because the In-
donesian government knew of and had not objected to Pan American's
acquisition of stock from Amco Asia.223 Consequently, the rule in
Amco is that the right to invoke an arbitration clause, that a foreign
parent corporation acquires, attaches to the foreign parent corpora-
tion's investment.224 If the government of the host country approves of
212. Id.
213. Id. at 369.
214. Id. at 364.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 369.
217. Id. at 369-70.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 372.
220. Id. at 371.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 373.
224. Id. The tribunal reasoned that the right to invoke arbitration attached to the
stock of the investment, so that a cession of the shares also transferred the rights at-
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this transfer, the foreign parent corporation may then transfer the right
to invoke the arbitration clause through transferring its investment
from its foreign subsidiary to a local subsidiary of the host country 2 0
The tribunal in Amco affirmed its competence in asserting jurisdic-
tion over parties who acted as contracting parties to an investment dis-
pute. 26 After first determining that the parties actually intended IC-
SID arbitration, the tribunal could then assess the limits of its
competence. 27 Once the tribunal was certain not to bind a party who
was not properly bound in the ICSID contract, the tribunal defined its
competence broadly.2 28 This expansive jurisdictional interpretation fa-
cilitates recognition of the power of ICSID to settle disputes2 9 and en-
sures that ICSID will continue to apply to many kinds of new invest-
ment disputes in the future.
a. Suggestions for Defining Investor
Parties negotiating an ICSID contract should clearly define the na-
tionality of an "investor" for ICSID purposes and can look to BITs for
models. Most BITs determine the nationality of a corporation on the
basis of its place of incorporation.2 3 BITs also determine the national-
ity of a corporation on the basis of control.2 31 For example, when a
corporation incorporates in the host state, but another foreign con-
tracting state controls the corporation, BITs treat the corporation as a
national of the foreign contracting state.
2 32
While BITs usually define "juridical person" on the basis of control
or place of incorporation, their definitions of "foreign control" differ.
2 3
Parties to an ICSID contract should specify what "foreign control"
means when they incorporate the term into an ICSID contract. The
parties can look to several models in BITs for a definition. Some BITs
provide that foreign-controlled corporations are those under the control
of nationals or corporations of the other contracting state to ICSID
tached to the shares. Id. Consequently, the Indonesian government's approval of the
cession constituted consent to arbitration. Id.
225. Id. at 372-73.
226. See Rand, Hornick & Friedland, supra note 10, at 60 (analyzing that the
brevity of the tribunal's discussion of its jurisdiction in Amco obscures the reasoning
behind the tribunal's extension of jurisdiction).
227. Id. at 61.
228. Id.
229. Id.






arbitration or conciliation.23 Occasionally, BITs leave the definition to
the discretion of the two contracting states.235 Parties negotiating an
ICSID contract, however, should avoid leaving the term undefined, be-
cause the parties are likely to disagree about the definition once a dis-
pute arises.
Bilateral investment treaties of the United States provide broad in-
terpretations of the term "foreign control." 26 The United Kingdom, by
contrast, usually incorporates narrow definitions of the term "foreign
control" in its BITs. 237 British BITs define a foreign-controlled com-
pany as a company incorporated under the laws of the country of one
of the parties to an ICSID contract and where, before a dispute arises,
nationals or companies of the other contracting party own a majority of
the shares.238 To register a claim after a dispute arises, the parties sub-
mit the evidence necessary to prove foreign control to the Secretary
General of ICSID.2 39 The advantage of the definition in the British
BITs is that it limits the issue of foreign control to the question of
proof of ownership.240
Another problem may arise when a party from a market economy
wants to negotiate an ICSID contract with a party from a non-market
economy (NME). Determining the nationality of public entities in a
NME is easy because the nationality is the same as that of the
NME.24' The investor, however, must know which entities may submit,
in the capacity of investors, to ICSID conciliation or arbitration.242 The
234. See Egypt - Japan Treaty, supra note 60, art. I I (stating that any company of
a contracting party that the nationals and companies of the other contracting party
controlled prior to the dispute shall submit to arbitration).
235. Agreement Between the Republic of Finland and the Arab Republic of Egypt
on Mutual Protection of Investments, May 5, 1980, Republic of Finland - Arab Repub-
lic of Egypt, art. 1(3), reprinted in INVESTMErr LAWS OF THE WORLD 1980 INVEST-
MENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION TREATIES 49, 50 (ICSID ed. 1983) (allowing the
contracting parties the discretion to define "foreign control").
236. See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of In-
vestments, Sept. 29, 1982, United States - Egypt, art. 1(b), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 927,
927-49 (1982) (allowing each party to reserve the right to deny, to any of its own
companies or to companies of the other party, advantages of the treaty if nationals of
any third country own or control the company).
237. 2:1 NEWs FROM ICSID, 18 (1985).
238. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, June 26, 1980, United Kingdom - North-
ern Ireland - Bangladesh, art. 8, reprinted in INvESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD 1980
INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION TREATIES 71, 74 (ICSID ed. 1983).
239. 2:1 NEWS FROM ICSID 18 (1985).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 19.
242. Id.
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specific entities that can submit to ICSID conciliation or arbitration
differ from one country to another.243
Bilateral investment treaties have yet to resolve another significant
question affecting parties entering into ICSID contracts. BITs have not
specified whether a contracting party may incorporate a third state into
an ICSID contract and still fall within the scope of article 25(2)(b) of
the ICSID Convention. Until an ICSID decision settles this question,
contracting parties may regularly challenge ICSID jurisdiction.
Multilateral investment treaties also define the term "investor". The
Andean Code, for example, requires parties to specifically identify the
investor in the application for foreign investment.244 The Andean Code
requires parties to include the following information about the investor:
the name or firm name, nationality, and membership of the Board of
Directors.245 The agreement must also include the composition of per-
sonnel and management, economic activity, and a copy of the articles
of incorporation of the investor.246 While the Andean Code delineates
specific requirements, it is not complete. The Code fails to identify for-
eign controlled investors.
The MIGA Convention affords a broader definition of the term "in-
vestor.247 Under the MIGA Convention, an investor is a national of a
member country. Moreover, a corporate investor is a corporation that
either incorporates or has its principal place of business in a member
country or has nationals of member countries that own the majority of
the corporation's capital.248 MIGA also defines an investor as a na-
tional of the host country who transfers the assets invested from
abroad.249 Parties to an ICSID contract can use these varying defini-
tions of an "investor" to ascertain their jurisdictional status.
III. EFFECT OF THE ANNULMENT DECISIONS
The parties to the dispute provide input at the first level of arbitral
review but have less influence over the proceedings at the annulment
243. See Agreement Between the Government of Sweden and the Government of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Mutual Protection of Investments,
Nov. 10, 1978, - Sweden - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, art. I (3)(b),
reprinted in INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD, 1978 INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION TREATIES 47, 48 (ICSID ed. 1983) (authorizing jurisdiction based on the
treaties' definition of 'company').
244. Andean Code, supra note 32, Annex No. 1.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. MIGA Convention, supra note 12, art. 13(a).
248. Id.
249. Id. art. 13(c).
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level.250 While the parties choose the members of the original tribu-
nal,251 the chairman of ICSID appoints a three member ad hoc com-
mittee to decide annulments.252 Consequently, annulments of a tribu-
nal's award appears inappropriate because of the lack of input from the
parties to the dispute.
If the frequency of annulment proceedings increases, parties may
discontinue using ICSID arbitration. Generally, parties believe that the
ad hoc committee members are not as sympathetic to their claims as
the arbitrators the parties originally chose. Moreover, none of the ad
hoc committee members can be nationals of a state party to the dispute
or of the state whose national is a party to the dispute.2 3 This provision
gives the chairman of ICSID too much discretion and power to deter-
mine the outcome of a case. Consequently, parties may seek to settle
their disputes through procedures other than ICSID arbitration.
Conversely, annulment procedures may actually make ICSID a more
desirable alternative to investment disputes. For instance, LDCs prefer
a forum where they know they can appeal from a detrimental determi-
nation. The annulment procedure gives an LDC, such as Indonesia, the
opportunity to challenge an unfavorable decision.2" Additionally, in
Kl5ckner v. Cameroon, ICSID granted an annulment to a private in-
vestor, the losing party in the original decision. 5 Consequently, annul-
ments benefit both private parties and LDCs in that they both can
challenge arbitrations in which they lost. These benefits may actually
make ICSID a more desirable forum for investment disputes.
Some commentators argue that annulment decisions of "final and
binding" arbitral awards create instability in international business.
2w
Arguably, if LDCs and investors continue to annul future ICSID
awards, the decisions of the tribunal will become meaningless. Most
judicial systems, however, provide processes for challenging awards.
25 7
The awards of the ICC and other arbitral bodies are not "final"
awards, even though the arbitration clauses in the contract refer to sub-
mission to arbitration as "final and binding." Furthermore, the awards
250. See Branson, supra note 3, at 25 (stating that the parties appoint the arbitra-
tors to the original panel but do not appoint the arbitrators to the reviewing panel).
251. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 37(2)(b) (providing that if the par-
ties do not agree on the number of arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator
and jointly agree on a third).
252. Id., art. 52(3).
253. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 52(3).
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are not final even though the ICC expressly states that parties "have
waived their right to any form of appeal" subsequent to the ICC mak-
ing an award.2 58
Although arbitral awards are not subject to appellate review, they
are subject to challenge. The losing party must file a "plea in nul-
lity."2 59 For example, where the venue is Switzerland, a Swiss court, as
a matter of right, can review an ICC or ad hoc arbitral award as well
as the successive appeal of that award. Similarly, a losing party under
the AAA has a right to assert many grounds to stop enforcement of an
arbitral award, including the right to appeal the award. 260 The AAA
allows appellate review even though the AAA guarantees enforcement
of arbitral awards in the countries that assented to the AAA treaty.
20'
Courts that review arbitral awards under pleas in nullity or under
the AAA treaty should not subject arbitral awards to appellate re-
view. 62 The courts should not review arbitral awards to determine if
the original arbitral panel erred in interpreting the relevant law.20 3
Failure to apply the relevant law, however, suggests that the arbitral
panel exceeded its power and is a ground for nullity.
2 4
The distinction between appellate review and arbitral challenge,
however, is often meaningless. Although the test for annulment is dif-
ferent on its face from the test for appellate review, the content in both
tests is almost exactly the same.215 As a result, when an ad hoc com-
mittee annuls an arbitral award, it is actually reviewing the original
panel's interpretation of the law because the tests for annulment and
appellate review are essentially the same. Therefore, the committee is
exceeding its arbitral power because the committee is reviewing the
original arbitral panel's interpretation of the relevant law.
The ICSID annulment procedure is thus similar to a court's appel-
late review of arbitral awards. The ICSID's annulment procedure, how-
ever, is even more efficient because it has only one level of review, that
of the ad hoc committee. 0 6 Other arbitral bodies, such as the AAA
and ICC, allow the losing party to appeal to multiple levels of a na-








266. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 51(3) (stating that a party should
submit a request for annulment to the tribunal that rendered the award, and if this is
not possible, ICSID will appoint a new tribunal).
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tion's courts. Moreover, under the ICC, the losing party can appeal a
denial of a plea in nullity in the country that held the arbitration.
Under the AAA, the losing party can challenge the award in the coun-
try seeking enforcement.261 Consequently, the limited review available
through ICSID makes ICSID awards more "final" than arbitration
awards of other arbitral bodies.
CONCLUSION
The ICSID annulments of the awards in Amco and Klbckner will
actually strengthen ICSID arbitration, even though they appear at first
glance to disrupt the stability of ICSID. Parties, primarily ICSID con-
tracting parties, will continue to use ICSID arbitration in the future.
External developments such as the establishment of MIGA, the lack of
other adequate arbitral tribunals and increasing LDC demand for di-
rect foreign investment indicate that demand for ICSID arbitration
will increase in the future. Moreover, internal developments such as the
arbitral tribunals expansive interpretations of ICSID allow contracting
parties to apply ICSID provisions to a wider scope of circumstances.
ICSID benefits both investors as well as LDCs. ICSID allows inves-
tors a means of enforcing awards. Investors, moreover, can insert provi-
sions to tailor agreements to their own needs. They can thus protect
against the political risks of investing in an LDC. In addition, the pro-
visions of ICSID allow most LDCs to draft agreements that consider
political and economic ramifications. As a result of these developments,
both LDCs and foreign investors will continue to rely on ICSID as a
stable forum for settling investment disputes and ICSID arbitration
will continue to gain importance in the future.
267. Branson, supra note 3, at 28.
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